The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A Research Agenda by Young, Ernest A.
THE CONSTITUTIVE AND ENTRENCHMENT FUNCTIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONS: A RESEARCH AGENDA
Ernest A. Youni
Constitutional law suffers from a disconnect between what the
Constitution does and how the Constitution is defined. It is com-
monplace to think of a "constitution" as serving a number of differ-
ent functions: it "constitutes" the government by establishing govern-
ing institutions, conferring powers upon them, and setting the
boundaries of their jurisdiction; it confers rights on individuals
against government action; and it entrenches these institutions and
rights against legal change. When we ask what the Constitution is,
however, Americans tend to focus exclusively on entrenchment.
"The Constitution" is the document ratified in 1789 and subsequently
amended through a difficult supermajoritarian procedure set forth in
Article V. It is obvious, however, that our institutions are "consti-
tuted" by a vast range of additional legal materials-consider, for ex-
ample, the statutes creating the national administrative bureaucra-
cies, the Judicial Code defining federal jurisdiction and procedure, or
the rules that govern party and committee organization and voting
requirements in the Senate and House of Representatives. Likewise,
many of our most important individual rights-the right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of age or disability, the right to in-
come security and healthcare in old age, or to the enjoyment and se-
curity of our property-are conferred by statutes. What makes the
1789 document and its amendments unique is that they can only be
changed in a particular way, that is, by running the gauntlet of Article
V. What defines "the Constitution" is its formal process of enactment
and the concomitant difficulty of changing the canonical text.
It does not have to be this way. The British have a constitution,
but it is not generally entrenched.' Lacking a distinctive formal pro-
* Professor of Law, Duke Law School. This brief Essay develops some of the ideas sug-
gested in Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408
(2007).
1 Certain complications have recently arisen due to Britain's acquiescence to the suprem-
acy of European Union law, but Parliament remains sovereign-that is, able to change
any law by ordinary legislative processes-in theory and, most of the time, in practice.
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cedure for entrenching constitutional norms, the British define their
constitution by reference to the constitutive and rights-conferring
functions: the statutes and practices constituting institutions and
conferring rights on individuals are considered to be part of "the
Constitution" despite the absence of any formal distinction between
such norms and "ordinary" law. Americans might learn something
about our own constitutional order by rethinking the boundaries of
constitutional law in a similar fashion. In particular, this perspective
might both break down some of the barriers between traditional and
positive scholarship relating to the Constitution and also suggest
some areas in which positive work may enhance our understanding of
constitutional dynamics.
This brief Essay traces the outline of a functional view of American
constitutionalism, emphasizing the distinction between a constitu-
tion's government-constituting functions and its entrenchment
against subsequent legal change. The final section identifies some
questions revealed by this perspective that positive scholars may wish
to take up.
I. THE EXTRA-CANONICAL CONSTITUTION
Although the British Constitution is frequently described as "un-
written," that is a misnomer. Most of the legal materials that make up
the British Constitution are written down somewhere-in Magna
Carta, in the Parliament Acts, in the Human Rights and Devolution
Acts, et cetera. What the British lack is a codified or canonical consti-
tution-a single document that purports to collect their constitutive
commitments in one place and, perhaps, entrench that set of com-
mitments against easy change.2
Consider two basic functions that constitutions peiform in most
constitutional systems. They create the institutions of government-
ordain their structure, confer their powers, limit their jurisdiction,
and determine methods for selection, supervision, and discharge of
their officers. And they confer rights on individuals to resist action by
these governmental institutions. While it will occasionally be helpful
See, e.g., Paul Craig, Constitutional and Non-Constitutional Review, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
147, 162 (2001).
2 ADAM TOmKINS, PUBLIC LAw 7 (2003).
3 See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 1 (2000) ("Constitutions al-
locate basic powers to officials and recognize fundamental rights of citizens .... ."); Frank
I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS 64, 65 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (defining "constitutional essentials" as "(a) the
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to distinguish between the institution-creating and rights-conferring
functions, I will also group these two constitutional tasks-which are
to at least some extent flip-sides of one another 4 -together as the
"constitutive" function.
Our Constitution also performs a third function: it entrenches
certain institutions and rights against easy change. Not all constitu-
tions do this; as I have already noted, the British Constitution is not
entrenched. (It might be more precise to say that all constitutions
perform an entrenchment function in the sense that they all contain,
explicitly or implicitly, a rule setting the requirements for changing
their own content. In systems like the British, however, that rule is
identical to the requirements for ordinary legislation.) In America,
however, the idea that the Constitution is specially insulated from
change by a set of formal and quite difficult amendment require-
ments has come to be foundational to our sense of constitutional
definition.
It is not my purpose here to develop a definitive list of constitu-
tional functions. We might identify others beyond those I have listed,
but these three are sufficient to test my central descriptive claim,
which is that the functions we generally attribute to the Constitution
are not, in fact, performed exclusively-or even primarily-by the
canonical document.
This is plainly true of institution creation: Think of all the crucial
institutions in modern government-the Federal Reserve, the alpha-
bet-soup agencies, the lower federal courts-that are not even men-
tioned, or that are only authorized, not created, in the canonical
document. Or consider how Congress would function if it only had
the structures and rules provided by Article I-that is, if it had no de-
fined electorate (provided by state law), no political parties, no com-
mittee system, and no voting rules for legislative action.
The canonical constitution is also far from our exclusive source of
individual rights. Some canonical rights are parasitic on extra-
plan of political government-offices, branches, levels, procedures, power distributions,
and competency ranges-and (b) the list of personal rights and liberties, if any, that the
constituted government is bound to respect." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4 See Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 16, 22 ("Constitutions restrict the reach of the state by a
proper specification of what it may and may not do. They may do this by defining an ex-
clusive grant of public power and/or by removing from its control certain favored private
activities.").
5 See COOTER, supra note 3, at 1; Michael J. Perry, What Is "the Constitution"? (and Other Fun-
damental Questions), in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3,
at 99, 103.
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canonical entitlements (the Takings Clause protects property rights
created by state law); others have been eclipsed by statutory analogs
(Title VII provides broader and deeper protection against race and
sex discrimination in employment than does the Equal Protection
Clause); and some crucial rights (the electoral franchise, public edu-
cation, healthcare and income security in old age) have no ground-
ing in the canonical text at all.
Even the entrenchment function is not exclusively reserved to the
canonical constitution. Some norms are practically entrenched even
though they may be amended or repealed by ordinary legislation.
Which is more likely in the next five years: amendment of the Consti-
tution to prohibit flag-burning, or repeal of the Social Security Act?
Moreover, there are more than two degrees of entrenchment. As the
Supreme Court's decisions in the military commissions and Oregon
right-to-die cases illustrate, it makes a great deal of difference
whether an existing set of rights and/or institutional arrangements
can be changed by executive fiat, or whether a new statute is neces-
sary to effect the change.6 Whether legislative amendments are re-
quired to change the law is typically a question of statutory, not con-
stitutional, construction, and this relative entrenchment question is
particularly important when the political branches are closely divided
politically and the Supreme Court is reluctant to recognize new cate-
gories of fundamental rights.
In our legal order, no less than in Britain, constitutional functions
are pervasively performed by a "constitution outside the constitu-
tion"-that is, a set of extra-canonical norms and institutions that
structure our government, confer our rights, and specify the re-
quirements for legal change. If we define our "Constitution" func-
tionally, rather than formally, then all these extra-canonical norms
are part of "the Constitution" of the United States. I do not mean to
discount the importance of the traditional formal definition for cer-
tain purposes. Nonetheless, I submit that a broader, functional per-
spective can yield important insights for constitutional law and the-
ory.
6 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (holding that the President could not try
suspected terrorists before military commissions using procedures that depart from tradi-
tional courts martial without specific authorization from Congress); Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) (invalidating a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General that
defined the use of drugs for physician-assisted suicide as an illegitimate use under the
Controlled Substances Act).
[Vol. 10:2
Jan. 2008] CONSTITUTIVE AND ENTRENCHMENT FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 403
Although I have developed this functional definition of our "Con-
stitution" by way of comparative constitutional experience, similar ac-
counts emerge from the Legal Realist tradition and from positive
theory. 7 (The latter fact may explain my otherwise-puzzling invitation
to this Symposium.) The Realist account emerges from Karl Lle-
wellyn's largely forgotten foray into public law, which identified a
"working Constitution" with only a tenuous relationship to the ca-
nonical text.8 As examples, Llewellyn invoked "the privilege of Sena-
torial filibuster; the powers of the Conference Committee; the Presi-
dent's power of removal; the Supreme Court's power of review; the
party system; the campaign fund."9 The scope of this extra-canonical
constitution was defined simply by those norms and institutions that
the relevant political actors considered to be largely beyond altera-
tion.' °
Positive theorists have likewise tended to view "the Constitution"
as the set of basic rules and practices that structure our government,
often without paying a great deal of attention to whether particular
rules or practices are included within the canonical document. Den-
nis Mueller's work on "Constitutional Democracy," for example, de-
fines a constitution as "the set of rules that define a community's po-
litical institutions."" The constitutional features that he discusses
include the structure of political parties and different voting rules in
the legislature-issues that, in the American legal order, are deter-
mined by rules existing outside the canonical document and amend-
able by ordinary legislation or, in many instances, by changes in the
practices of particular political actors.12 It may be considerably easier
for scholars with a positive orientation to recognize the constitutive
7 The comparative and realist traditions meet in Matthew Palmer's insightful work on the
Constitution of New Zealand. Matthew S. R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to Identify
the Complete Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM.J. COMP. L. 587, 593
(2006); Matthew S.R. Palmer, What Is New Zealand's Constitution and Who Interprets It? Con-
stitutional Realism and the Importance of Public Office-Holders, 17 PUB. L. REV. 133 (2006).
8 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934) ("A re-
canvass of the nature of any working constitution, and especially of ours, as being in es-
sence not a document, but a living institution built (historically, genetically) in first in-
stance around a particular Document... would lay the foundation for an intelligent
reconstruction of our constitutional law theory.").
9 Id. at 15.
10 Id. at 28-30 ("To be unambiguously a part of the working Constitution... [t]he actors,
and any non-actors in a position to block or modify action, must feel that the way or insti-
tution, is not subject to abrogation or material alteration .... ").
11 DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43 (1996).
12 See also COOTER, supra note 3 (discussing a similar mix of canonical and extra-canonical
features as part of the American Constitution).
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functions of ordinary legislation and practices than it is for traditional
practitioners of constitutional law.
II. DECOUPLING THE CONSTITUTIVE AND ENTRENCHMENT FUNCTIONS
As I noted at the outset, the formal entrenchment of the canoni-
cal text against subsequent legal change has come to define the
boundaries of constitutional law in America. The situation is alto-
gether different in Britain; because Britain's constitutive statutes and
practices are not specially entrenched, "there is no special signifi-
cance attached to the adjective 'constitutional,"' and "constitutional
law is not sharply demarcated from other areas of law." 3 Even in the
United States, political scientists seem to think in terms of "public
law," rather than distinguishing sharply between "constitutional" law
and everything else, the way that lawyers do.' 4 Among American law-
yers, however, entrenchment of the Constitution against legal change
seems essential to what "the Constitution" is.
1 5
This is true even of scholars who argue for the existence of consti-
tutional norms outside the canonical text. Bruce Ackerman, for ex-
ample, is famous for arguing that the Constitution has been amended
outside the Article V process and now includes any number of prin-
ciples that do not show up in the text. 6 Yet Professor Ackerman's
theory is built around a sharp distinction between "higher lawmak-
ing" and "ordinary politics," and he urges that subsequent interpret-
ers should treat the products of the former-e.g., the administrative
state produced by the New Deal-as entrenched against amendment
by way of the latter. 7 Similarly, William Eskridge and John Ferejohn
argue that certain "super-statutes" have attained the status of "quasi-
constitutional law," and a crucial component of super status is a de-
gree of special durability against legal change and of special influ-
ence on the interpretation of subsequent legislation. 8 And of course
the whole debate about unenumerated constitutional rights amounts
to an effort to entrench certain extra-canonical norms-e.g., pri-
vacy-against legislative departures. This pervasive focus on en-
13 TOMKINS, supra note 2, at 16.
14 The University of Texas Government Department, for example, has a "public law" divi-
sion rather than a "constitutional law" division.
15 This was even true of Karl Llewellyn's "realist" view. See supra note 10.
16 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
17 See id. at 6.
18 William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE LJ. 1215, 1265-66
(2001).
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trenchment makes being part of "the Constitution" a function of a
norm's status, rather than its function.
Thinking of the Constitution in terms of status makes it important
to develop a rule of recognition to determine which norms and insti-
tutions have this status and which do not. Much turns, after all, on
inclusion or exclusion from the category: a right of privacy cannot be
overturned by subsequent legislation if it is part of the Constitution in
this sense. Once we abandon the canonical rule of recognition in Ar-
ticle V, however, these boundaries become quite difficult to draw.
Criticism of Professor Ackerman's "constitutional dualism," for ex-
ample, has often focused on the difficulty of identifying transforma-
tive "constitutional moments" and specifying the precise changes that
they make to the Constitution. 19 Similar criticisms can be made of
"super-statutes" and unenumerated individual rights.
Decoupling the entrenchment and constitutive functions elimi-
nates much of the pressure to develop a precise rule of recognition
for extra-canonical norms. My argument here is that ordinary laws
often perform constitutional functions, but I do not say that those
laws are any less ordinary as a consequence. My definition of "the
Constitution" derives from function, not status. Consequently, I can
afford to acknowledge that an extremely wide range of laws and prac-
tices-any law that creates a governmental office or entitlement, for
example, or specifies a procedure-have some constitutive elements,
and that the outer boundaries of the category may be fuzzy indeed.
This observation points toward a simpler and much more incre-
mental understanding of constitutional change outside Article V: the
constitutional order can change dramatically over time precisely be-
cause much of it has always been composed of ordinary laws and
practices tha are not constitutionally entrenched.
I have explored this last argument about constitutional change in
more depth elsewhere. 20 For present purposes, the important point is
the expanded jurisdiction that this account opens up for constitu-
tional scholarship. Constitutional scholars ought to be concerned
with constitutive arrangements, regardless of the degree to which
they are constitutionally entrenched. Two of the most important
growth areas in legal scholarship-foreign affairs and election law-
19 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REv. 918, 923 (1992)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)); L.A. Powe, Jr.,
Ackermania or Uncomfortable Truths?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 547, 570 (1998) (reviewing
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)).
20 SeeYoung, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, supra note *, Part II.B.
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take this approach, being equally concerned with statutory enact-
ments and canonical constitutional provisions that structure the
field.2 ' This is likewise true of the older discipline of Federal Courts
scholarship, which tends to view enactments like the Rules of Deci-
sion Act or the statutory guarantee that state courts are the final word
on state law as fundamentally constitutive of our constitutional or-
der.2 Much of the mainstream of constitutional scholarship and
practice tends to ignore statutes, regulations, and practices, however.
Both scholars and judges have frequently rejected, for example, the
notion that constitutional federalism can be protected through rules
of statutory construction; instead, they seem to see interpretation of
the canonical provisions themselves as the sole legitimate vehicle for
protecting structural values.23
Including constitutive statutes, regulations, and practices within
the domain of constitutional law would also open up opportunities to
consider matters of institutional design. Given "[t] he functional im-
possibility of amending the Constitution with regard to anything truly
significant,''24 most constitutional scholars seem to see their opportu-
21 See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY &JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2006) (covering both constitutional provisions bearing on foreign af-
fairs and subconstitutional law, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act
of State doctrine); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007) (cover-
ing constitutional provisions as well as the Voting Rights Act and other statutory enact-
ments).
22 In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874), for example, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the statutory provision for its review of state court decisions as limited to federal
questions, leaving the final say on state questions to the state courts. As Martha Field has
observed, "It is... because of Murdock that the whole concept of state law as distinct from
federal law is a meaningful one.... Erie and Murdock together... give states control over
their own law in a way we unquestionably presuppose them having today." Martha A.
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 921-22
(1986).
23 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 300-01 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that, once the Court had upheld the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as
within Congress's constitutional commerce power, federalism values became irrelevant to
interpreting the CSA's meaning (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)); Viet D.
Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2117 (2000) ("Redefining the
proper balance of legislative powers between Congress and the states is better accom-
plished directly, through an insistence on the limits of Congress's enumerated and lim-
ited powers under Article I, rather than circuitously and ineffectually through some vague
and ill-conceived presumption against preemption under the Supremacy Clause."); Ilya
Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rules After Gonzales v. Raich, 2006 CATO
SUp. CT. REV. 113, 114-15 ("Clear statement rules sometimes protect the interests of state
governments, but that is very different from protecting constitutional federalism.").
24 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 167 (2006).
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nities to think about matters of design as confined to those heady oc-
casions when they are invited to Eastern Europe or some island in the
South Pacific to consult on the drafting of a new constitutional
document. But our American legal order confronts any number of
fundamental institutional questions upon which the canonical docu-
ment is relatively silent. How, for example, is our domestic judicial
system to be integrated with emerging global judicial networks and
supranational courts?25 Most scholars writing about this issue from a
constitutional perspective have sought to apply certain canonical
rules and doctrines, such as the Appointments Clause or the non-
delegation doctrine.26 To my mind, however, these canonical princi-
ples offer relatively little purchase. Given the relative infancy of the
relevant international institutions and the dearth of entrenched con-
stitutional rules, the energies of constitutional scholars would be bet-
ter directed toward applying what we already know about constitu-
tional structures to the design task of drafting framework legislation
to govern the interface of domestic and international legal institu-
27tions. We are generally not inclined to see such drafting exercises as
part of "constitutional" scholarship, but we should.
As my discussion of institutional design suggests, emphasizing the
constitutive role of ordinary law will also tend to shift the institutional
focus of constitutional lawyers away from courts. As William Fisch
and Richard Kay have pointed out, "subconstitutional law in the
American legal system is principally the product of legislation," while
much constitutional lawmaking is done by courts.2 8 This institutional
disparity has important consequences for the impetus, decision struc-
ture, and transparency of lawmaking, as well as the accountability of
the actors involved and the form of the rules that emerge. 9 In many
25 See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 84 (2004); Jenny S. Martinez,
Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); Ernest A. Young, Insti-
tutional Settlement in a GlobalizingJudicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143 (2005).
26 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-
Execution, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1557 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to In-
ternational Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 71 (2000); Ed-
ward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492
(2004); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998).
27 For an effort in this direction, see Ernest A. Young, Toward a Framework Statute for Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 57 EMORY LJ. 93 (2008).
28 William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Constitutionalization of Law in the United States, 46
AM.J. COMP. L. 437, 459 (Supp. 1998).
29 See id. at 461 ("[O]rdinary (subconstitutional) lawmaking, at least in its optimum form, is
controlled by publicly accountable agencies acting on frankly political grounds through
the promulgation of prospective, generally applicable and reasonably well-defined rules
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areas of current controversy, we confront a choice as to whether to
deal with manifestly constitutive issues through extension of canoni-
cal constitutional principles by courts or through the development of
new subconstitutional structures by political actors. The debate
about whether to address political gerrymandering of electoral dis-
tricts through equal protection doctrine or new districting proce-
dures, for example, raises a question of this kind.30 Acknowledging
that "ordinary" lawmaking by political actors frequently resolves con-
stitutive questions may help overcome habits of thinking that bias us
in favor ofjudicial resolution.
III. THE POWER OF POSITIVE THINKING
I have already noted the affinities between positive perspectives on
law and the functional approach to constitutionalism suggested here.
In this last Part, I want to identify a number of areas in which positive
work might fruitfully develop and enhance that functional perspec-
tive. Such work is essential if we are both to understand the constitu-
tive roles played by ordinary law in our present legal order and to de-
sign institutional solutions to realize or maintain important
constitutional values.
The first set of research questions fit under what Professor Ver-
meule characterizes as "prescriptive theory": they ask how we can
best design institutional means to vindicate values embodied in the
canonical constitution.3 ' The "political safeguards of federalism," for
example, are now often conceded to reside not so much in canonical
features like equal state representation in the Senate, but rather in
extra-canonical structures like political parties and the intertwining of
state and federal administrative bureaucracies. 3 The efficacy of those
safeguards has been questioned,3 3 and further extra-canonical meas-
of conduct. Constitutional lawmaking is, in contrast, the domain of politically independ-
entjudges acting, usually retrospectively, on the basis of large principles of public moral-
ity, shaping those principles to different problems in an evolving and, necessarily, some-
what unpredictable manner.").
30 LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (considering whether to adopt constitutional
restrictions on partisan gerrymandering).
31 Adrian Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 387
(2008).
32 See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 284 (2000).
33 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
46 VILL. L. REv. 951 (2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash &John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence
of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEXAs L. REV. 1459 (2001).
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ures-such as mandatory consideration of federalism impacts in ad-
ministrative rulemaking-have been proposed in order to shore
them up. Such proposals could benefit from serious scrutiny by posi-
tive scholars. Similar benefits seem likely to flow from positive evalua-
tions of proposals to protect separation of powers values through
"presidential administration, ' 4 and values of political competition
through restrictions on gerrymandering of voting districts . 5
My remaining suggestions all have to do with entrenchment and
its relation to the constitutive functions of a constitution. As I ob-
served earlier, entrenchment is not exclusively a function of a norm
or institution's formal status in our legal system. The Social Security
System remains the "third rail of American politics," deterring even
modest attempts at amendment, despite its status as an "ordinary"
statute. The First Amendment, on the other hand, has had a series of
narrow escapes from proposed amendments to prohibit flag burning,
and such an amendment remains a real political possibility. And
there are canonical principles which seem to be violated with rela-
tively little interest or fuss, such as the Twelfth Amendment's restric-
tion of presidential tickets on which the presidential and vice-
presidential nominee hail from the same state. 6 Entrenchment is
obviously a function of public salience and social consensus, in addi-
tion to formal requirements for amendment, but there is likely a
great deal more to know about how these variables operate in prac-
tice.
Another set of entrenchment questions focuses on formal en-
trenchment, but builds upon the observation that there are many
more steps on the entrenchment ladder than simply "higher lawmak-
ing" and "ordinary politics." Statutes are certainly harder to amend
than administrative regulations, and within the latter category some
forms (e.g., legislative rules) seem considerably more durable than
others (e.g., interpretive rules, letter rulings, et cetera). We also
34 Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
35 See supra note 30.
36 See generally Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 925 (2001) (suggesting that the Amendment's "Habitation Clause"
may well have been violated by the counting of Texas electors for both George W. Bush
and Richard Cheney in 2000, and wondering why this possible constitutional violation was
not taken as seriously as any number of less plausible constitutional claims arising out of
the election). The Twelfth Amendment does not prohibit such a ticket, but it does seem
to require that the favored state's votes be discounted for at least one of the candidates,
presumably the vice-president. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("The Electors shall meet in
their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom,
at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves . . ").
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know that certain judicial strategies for interpreting legislation, such
as "clear statement" canons of statutory construction, can have en-
trenchment effects by raising the costs of legislating in a particular
wayY But we could do with more systematic attention to the variable
entrenchment effects of governmental acts that take these various
forms, and investigation of the extent to which those effects may vary
according to the subject matter upon which the government is acting.
Likewise, the modern legislative process includes any number of
extra-canonical mechanisms that can affect the entrenchment of le-
gal rules by making it easier or harder to enact certain kinds of legis-
lation or promulgate certain sorts of administrative rules. These
mechanisms include, for example, additional veto-gates in the legisla-
tive process created by House and Senate procedures,' framework
laws creating special procedures for certain sorts of legislation,39 and
special executive branch review of administrative rules that preempt
state law.40 Positive scholarship obviously has an important role to
play in helping constitutional lawyers integrate these extra-canonical
mechanisms into their understanding of our constitutive arrange-
ments.
Finally, it would be helpful to know more about the costs and
benefits of formal constitutional entrenchment. There is a debate,
for example, about the extent to which all the values associated with
federalism-e.g., policy experimentation, citizen participation, and
the like-can be captured by decentralizing political authority over
certain questions without entrenching any commitment to such de-
centralization. 4' Defenders of entrenched federal structures have ar-
gued that governmental subdivisions that lack any entrenched au-
thority, like the French departments, may lack the longevity and
37 See, e.g.,JamesJ. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatteror Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30, 69 (1994); Vermeule, supranote 31.
38 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative Vetogates, Preemption, and Chevron Deference, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2008).
39 See Gerhard Casper, The Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 177, 187-93 (1985); Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2008).
40 See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999); Nina A. Mendelson,
Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 782-86 (2004) (discussing executive prac-
tice under the federalism order).
41 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REv. 903, 914 (1994) ("Of the standard arguments for federalism, four are really
arguments that specific national policies are best implemented by decentralized decision-making,
these are public participation, effectuating citizen choice through competition amongju-
risdictions, achieving economic efficiency through competition among jurisdictions, and
encouraging experimentation." (emphasis added)).
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stability to actually achieve the benefits associated with federalism.42
After all, why invest in developing a viable, competent government if
it may be shorn of its authority tomorrow? These contending views
will likely continue to talk past one another in the absence of serious
positive work on the extent to which constitutional entrenchment
may help an institution to further its goals. Conversely, such work
might valuably consider whether entrenchment is necessary, under
modern conditions, to protect values and groups that were once
thought seriously endangered. The political power of the modern
media, for example, might suggest that a constitutional system de-
signed today might require a less rigorous Press Clause than that con-
tained in the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
If one asked a political scientist, "What are the key features of the
American constitutional order?" I suspect the answer would include
not only canonical features like a bicameral legislature and a life-
tenured judiciary, but also features like the two-party system and a
large administrative bureaucracy that have no grounding in the ca-
nonical document. I do not mean to suggest that these features are
illegitimate, but rather that constitutional lawyers should pay more
attention to them as constitutional features. Broadening our defini-
tion of the Constitution along functional lines, and decoupling that
definition from the question of which norms and institutions are con-
stitutionally entrenched, promises to yield important dividends in
constitutional theory, doctrine, and pedagogy. And by expanding
our definition of what counts as a constitutional question, this per-
spective should yield a wealth of opportunities for collaboration be-
tween traditional and positive approaches.
42 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2218-19 (1998) ("Rubin and Feeley's analysis ... underestimates
the value of states as alternative locations of independently derived government power.
Were the states not guaranteed existence within defined borders, for example, a national
government unhappy with decisionmaking in its centrally defined administrative units
could simply reorganize the political boundaries of those units to create more compliant
decision-making, or to isolate 'troublemakers.'" (footnotes omitted)).

